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We examine whether, on legal or policy grounds, Internet protocol-enabled video services
provided over a telephone network should be regulated as a cable service. We evaluate the
history of cable regulation and the services that Congress envisioned to be regulated when it
first drafted legislation establishing a regulatory framework for cable television services in
1984. We then examine numerous differences between the IP-enabled video services delivered
over a telephone network and those that Congress envisioned when regulating cable television
service in 1984 and in subsequent years when it revised the Cable Act of 1984. Finally, we find
that municipal franchise requirements for IP-enabled video services provided over telephone
networks would reduce consumer welfare. We estimate that, upon ubiquitous deployment by
telephone companies of fiber networks to provide video service, cable customers living in areas
not yet overbuilt by a wireline distributor of multi-channel video programming would enjoy the
benefits of lower prices of roughly $7.15 per month, or $85.80 per year. A five-year net present
value of the annualized savings would be roughly $26.52 billion (assuming a five percent
discount rate). To the extent that direct broadcast satellite operators respond to lower cable
prices with price reductions of their own, the net present value of the welfare benefits from
telephone company entry into the market for multi-channel video programming distribution
would increase by roughly 50 percent, to nearly $40 billion. We estimate that, even without
considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, these consumer welfare gains from entry
exceed the potential loss in franchise fee revenues to municipalities by a factor of nearly three to
one.
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INTRODUCTION

Beginning around 2004, certain local telephone companies—most notably,
AT&T (the former SBC) and Verizon—began to upgrade their local fiber networks
to provide a bundle of services consisting of voice over Internet protocol (VoIP),
digital video, and high-speed Internet access. Once the fiber upgrade is completed,
a local telephone company will have the capability to offer multiple high-quality
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television streams that include high-definition television video (HDTV)
programming and video-on-demand for each household. These upgraded telephone
networks will provide a third pipeline for the delivery of multi-channel video
programming (MVPD) services to compete against cable television operators and
direct broadcast satellites (DBS), and will provide a comprehensive service
package in competition with cable’s bundle of voice, video, and data services. In
September 2005, the investment firm Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. predicted that by
2010 nearly 40 percent of U.S. households will be able to get video service from
their local telephone company.1
Verizon has named its new fiber network “FIOS.” Verizon plans to invest $20
billion to lay thousands of miles of fiber-optic cables across its service area from
Maine to Florida and into parts of Texas and California.2 As of the end of October
2005, Verizon had initiated negotiations with roughly 300 municipalities, but it
had secured only fourteen franchise agreements (a 4.6 percent initial success rate)
for video service.3 Verizon’s low success rate has been attributed to “regulatory
holdup”—that is, unrealistic demands made by municipalities in return for
franchise approval.4 According to the Buckingham Research Group, the local
franchise requirements will delay telephone entry into video services by between
eight and sixteen months.5 Not only are municipalities seeking to impose onerous
requirements on telephone companies, but some are competing directly with local
telephone companies for broadband customers by launching citywide wireless
fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks.6 These municipalities (which include Philadelphia,
Madison, Minneapolis, Tempe, and Sacramento)7 have a pronounced incentive to
raise the entry cost of rival providers of broadband service.8 Indeed, the mere
threat that the municipality might build a broadband network could be sufficient to
extract additional payments from local telephone companies.
Verizon’s FIOS project started in the Dallas suburb of Keller, where the
company offered video service to residents in September 2005.9 Verizon planned
1. Peter Grant, Getting Your MTV From the Phone Company—Verizon Takes On Cable,
Offering Cheaper TV Service, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2005, at D1 (discussing Sanford C. Bernstein
study).
2. Dionne Searcey, Spotty Reception—As Verizon Enters Cable Business, It Faces Local
Static, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2005, at A1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The Buckingham Research Group, Communications Services As RBOC Video Efforts
Falter, Outlook Improves for DBS, Cable, June 13, 2005, at 3 (“Cable operators are subject to local
franchise approval processes, an arduous and time consuming process that can take anywhere from 618 months depending on the city and state.”).
6. Philadelphia announced in October 2005 that it had chosen EarthLink to provide citywide
wireless high-speed Internet access. By October 2005, San Francisco received 24 proposals from a
range of Internet and telecommunications companies interested in equipping that city for wireless
broadband, including a proposal by Google to offer the service free of charge. See Li Yuan & Kevin
J. Delaney, EarthLink Picked By Philadelphia To Provide Wi-Fi, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 2005, at A20.
According to muniwireless.com, a portal that tracks municipal wireless projects, the U.S. market for
municipal broadband is expected to grow to $400 million by 2007. See Jesse Drucker, Kevin J.
Delaney & Peter Grant, Google’s Wireless Plan Underscores Threat to Telecom—Free Internet
Access Proposal In San Francisco Lets Users Bypass Phone, Cable Links, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005,
at A1.
7. Drucker, Delaney & Grant, supra note 6.
8. See David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned
Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479 (2003) (explaining that entities that do not maximize profit,
which would include municipalities, have an increased incentive to attempt to harm competitors).
9. Searcey, supra note 2.
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to introduce its video service by the end of 2005 in other parts of the country,
including Fairfax County, Virginia; the New York City suburb of Massapequa
Park; a community outside of Tampa, Florida; and several communities in
California.10 Verizon was charging $36.90 per month for 140 channels of digital
service, and $43.90 for 185 channels of digital service, including the $3.95 rental
charge for a set-top box.11 The telecommunications consultancy Kagan Research
estimates that the comparable (digital) package from a cable company would cost
$55 per month.12 UBS Securities estimates that Verizon will spend $7 billion to
offer television service to about one-half of the 32 million homes reached by its
network,
AT&T has named its new fiber upgrade initiative “Project Lightspeed.” AT&T
plans to launch its video service in early 2006.13 AT&T predicts that it will be able
to provide video service to 18 million homes by the first half of 2008.14 For new
builds, AT&T is extending fiber all the way to the customer’s home. For existing
homes, AT&T is extending fiber-optic lines into nodes of those neighborhoods and
is using enhanced copper wire to carry video signals the last few thousand feet to
the home.15 Through this choice of network architecture, AT&T projects an initial
cost of $4 to $5 billion to offer video service.16
The technologies used by local telephone operators to offer video service are
distinct. Verizon will provide television signals using the same technology that
cable companies use, which essentially broadcasts all channels to a set-top box at
once.17 In contrast, AT&T’s video customers will request one channel at a time
from off-premises servers, using the same Internet protocol (IP) technology that
enables users to access Web pages on their computers.18 AT&T’s position is that
its IP-based, interactive approach using switched network facilities is not a cable
service or a cable system subject to the legal requirement under the Cable Act for
cable franchises. As of June 2005, a third regional Bell operating company
(RBOC), BellSouth, acknowledged that it was working with Microsoft to conduct
trials of its own IP-enabled video service,19 which would more closely resemble
AT&T’s switched network architecture than Verizon’s architecture.
This article seeks to evaluate whether IP-enabled video services provided over
a telephone network, including but not limited to the technology currently
employed by AT&T, are or should be subject to the same regulations as current
cable television services. In Part II, we examine the development of cable services.
Cable television was primarily retransmitted broadcast signals in its early stages.
Cable systems were franchised locally, and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) initially took a passive stance on several regulatory issues.
Rival programming distributors did not emerge until the late 1980s, and incumbent
10. Grant, Getting Your MTV, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Peter Grant, Technology (A Special Report): Telecommunications—Air Battle: SBC vs.
Verizon: The war of the TV wannabes, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2005, at R8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Peter Grunt, Robert A. Guth & David Pringle, Phone Companies Using Microsoft Hit TV
Service Snags, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2005, at B1. As of the end of 2005, it was not clear whether the
remaining RBOC, Qwest, was developing an IP-enable video service.
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cable operators responded by integrating vertically into content and then denying
rivals access to that affiliated content.
In Part III, we trace the development of other cable services by cable operators,
including cable modem service and cable telephony. We examine the FCC’s
decisions classifying those ancillary services as non-cable services, which meant
that those services were exempt from regulation under Title VI of the
Communications Act, as added by the 1984 Cable Act. The FCC concluded that
cable modem service was not a cable service because the broadband user controls
her experience, whereas the definition of cable service requires the operator to
control the user’s experience. The FCC’s decisions on the scope of cable services
have largely withstood scrutiny from the courts.
In Part IV, we analyze the regulatory history of cable service, beginning with
the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.20 In the 1984 Act, Congress
defined cable service as one-way programming comparable to broadcast television.
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 199221 sought
to protect consumers by re-regulating cable television rates and ensuring access to
affiliated programming by rival programming distributors, but this legislation did
not change the definition of cable services. The Telecommunications Act of 199622
sought to enhance competition in video programming by removing barriers to
entry, including barriers that prevented entry by telephone companies. Although
the 1996 Act expanded the definition of cable service, it did not change the
fundamental fact that “cable service” is a one-way service.
In Part V, we explain why IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone
network differs significantly from traditional one-way cable service. First, IPenabled video service provided over a switched telephone network is an interstate
service. For example, AT&T’s video service will use only two headends for
AT&T’s entire 13-state territory. Second, IP-based video service provided over a
telephone network is an interactive, two-way service that is controlled by the user.
We also explain several other features that distinguish the IP-based video service
provided over a telephone network from cable service. Applying the FCC’s
reasoning in its recent ruling on cable modem service (which the Supreme Court
upheld in June 2005) and the agency’s ruling on Internet telephony, one must
conclude that IP-based video service provided over a telephone network is not
properly classified as a cable service. Clearly, these arguments apply only to those
entrants who avail themselves of IP-enabled technologies.
Part VI analyzes how local cable franchising requirements would serve as an
entry barrier that would undermine the ability of telephone company entrants to
compete effectively with cable operators. The consumer welfare effects of this
regulatory entry barrier would be the same for entrants using either IP-enabled
technologies or non-IP-enabled technologies. We estimate that, upon ubiquitous
deployment by telephone companies of fiber networks to provide video service,
cable customers living in areas not yet overbuilt by a wireline provider would
enjoy the benefits of lower prices of roughly $7.15 per month, or $85.80 per year.
A five-year net present value of the annualized savings would be roughly $26.52
billion (assuming a five percent discount rate). To the extent that DBS providers
respond to lower cable prices with price reductions of their own, the net present
20. Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779.
21. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460.
22. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
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value of the welfare benefits from RBOC entry into MVPD markets would
increase by roughly 50 percent, to nearly $40 billion. We estimate that, even
without considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, these consumer
welfare gains from entry exceeds the potential loss in franchise fee revenues to the
cities by a factor of nearly three to one. Thus, the imposition of cable franchise
fees on IP-enabled video provided over telephony networks would generate a
substantial excess burden as a matter of public finance policy.
Finally, we scrutinize the potential economic justification for imposition of
additional fees for a telephone company’s use of the rights-of-way, which the
telephone company already has the right to use. With minor exceptions, there is no
incremental burden to the municipality from a local telephone company’s use of
those rights-of-way to offer IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone
network. To the extent that the local telephone company is required to or chooses
to pay any franchise fee, we explain why the appropriate percentage should be
significantlyless than five percent of video gross revenues, which is the maximum
amount that federal law permits municipalities to charge cable operators. We also
discuss why a uniform national approach to regulating IP-enabled video service
provided over a telephone network makes more sense and is more efficient than a
patchwork of municipal franchising. Finally, we evaluate the principal arguments
that cable operators have made before local regulatory entities in favor of requiring
municipal franchises for IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone
network.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CABLE SERVICES
Cable television began as the retransmission of terrestrial broadcast signals.
Although the FCC required that a cable system carry all local broadcast signals, the
agency was reluctant to intervene on issues such as franchising and rate regulation,
which it left to municipalities or the states. Cable operators were largely free from
competition in this era, as direct broadcast satellite firms did not establish a viable
presence until the early 1990s.
A. The Retransmission of Distant Broadcast Signals
Cable television began in the late 1940s as shared noncommercial community
antenna television (CATV) services to improve signal reception in areas where it
was poor.23 An antenna could be installed on a hilltop, and broadcast signals
received and retransmitted through a cable that fed the households in valleys and
other areas of restricted reception. These early systems could carry only a few
channels, and their customers were few. Non-broadcast programming was not
offered; audiences accessible through cable were too small, and the cost of
distributing to them would have been excessive. By the 1960s, premium
programming was offered experimentally to only a few homes. According to a
study by Stanley Besen and Robert Crandall in 1981, it took fifteen years—from
1948 to 1963—to connect the first million cable subscribers.24
23. For more extensive analysis of the issues addressed in this section, see ROBERT W.
CRANDALL & HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH, CABLE TV: REGULATION OR COMPETITION? (Brookings
Institution Press 1996).
24. Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 L. &
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 79 (1981).
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The cable industry began to grow as a result of retransmitting distant broadcast
signals through the use of microwave circuitry or very tall antennas. The FCC was
concerned that cable television would compete with broadcasters and thereby upset
the agency’s television spectrum allocations plan, which was meant to encourage
localism and required a broadcaster to provide purportedly uneconomical local
programming to its community of license. In 1962, the FCC limited cable’s
encroachment on local broadcasters’ monopolies by requiring a microwave carrier
to demonstrate that it would carry local signals and not distant ones that duplicated
the programming of the local stations.
In 1972, the FCC required that a cable system carry all local broadcast
signals.25 The 1972 rules also severely limited the cable operators’ choices. For
instance, in offering imported signals, cable operators could not leapfrog nearby
stations in favor of large-market independent stations. Premium programming,
with its extra cost to viewers, was virtually banned by a separate set of bizarre
rules that limited such programming to one feature film more than two years old
and less than ten years old per week for one week of each month. The same ruling
effectively prohibited all premium exhibitions of live sporting events that had been
traditionally available on “free” broadcast television. Many of these rules were
eventually rescinded by the FCC or vacated by the federal courts.
Key legislative and regulatory decisions in the 1970s and early 1980s spurred
the growth in cable programming. In 1972, the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s
assertion of power over cable’s origination of programming in Midwest Video I.26
In its 1977 Home Box Office decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit vacated the FCC rules that limited pay television offerings.27 The court
ruled that the FCC’s “antisiphoning” rules, which were designed to protect
television broadcasters, were an impermissible attempt to regulate cable program
formats.28 The decision cleared the way for expanded cable services. By this time,
low-cost satellite transmission replaced terrestrial microwave networks as the
principal means of distributing programming to both cable systems and broadcast
stations, thereby allowing a major expansion of cable offerings. In 1980, the FCC
abolished its restrictive signal-importation rules, which had limited a cable
system’s ability to import distant signals, and abolished the rules that required
program exclusivity on local cable systems.29 Cable systems were now free to
import as many distant signals as they desired without having to black out
programs that were also available on local stations.
B. Local Franchising of Cable Systems
The municipal franchising process developed around the building of the first
cable television systems in the 1960s and 1970s. Cable service was regulated on an
informal basis by municipalities, which controlled the easements under and over
public rights-of-way that cable needed to wire local communities.30 In addition to
25. Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration of Cable Television Report and
Order, FCC 72-530, 36 F.C.C.2d 326 (1972).
26. United States v. Midwestern Video Corp., 401 U.S. 649 (1972).
27. Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
28. Id.
29. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 45 Fed. Reg. 60,186 (FCC Sept.
11, 1980).
30. See, e.g., JOHN THORNE, PETER HUBER & MICHAEL KELLOGG, FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW
179 (Little Brown & Co. Law & Business 2002).

8

Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer

granting franchises, municipalities also regulated cable rates at the local level. The
FCC remained on the sidelines for much of this era. In the 1960s, some states
stepped into the power vacuum created by the FCC’s hands-off approach and
began to regulate cable directly.
Before the 1984 Supreme Court decision in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp,31 there was significant uncertainty over the boundaries between federal and
local regulatory jurisdiction of cable television. In Crisp, the Supreme Court held
that, by banning the importation of alcoholic beverage advertising into Oklahoma,
the state had trespassed on the authority of the FCC.32 In Community
Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, the Supreme Court held that the
city’s three-month moratorium prohibiting the local cable company from
expanding was not immune from antitrust scrutiny.33 As we explain below, the
1984 Cable Communications Act was motivated, in part, to clarify this uncertainty
over the proper division of federal and local government jurisdiction over cable
television.
C. The Emergence of Rival Programming Distributors and Vertical Integration
into Programming by Cable Operators
Notwithstanding rate regulation imposed by municipalities, there were no
market forces to constrain the prices of incumbent cable operators. Competitive
multichannel distribution technologies, including direct-to-home (DTH) satellite,
the predecessor to direct broadcast satellite, did not emerge until 1982.34 But the
DTH business was not viable, and satellite television providers did not become
effective competitors of cable until the early 1990s.35 Because DBS providers did
not require local rights-of-way to transmit video programming, they were able to
avoid the local franchising requirements imposed on cable operators. But these
entrants faced several impediments to competing effectively, including the
inability to secure video programming that was owned by incumbent cable
operators. By June 1995, all DBS operators combined (DIRECTV, U.S. Satellite
Broadcasting, and PrimeStar) had only 1.1 million subscribers.36 EchoStar entered
the market in 1996, and the number of DBS subscribers increased to over 5 million
by 1998.37 Cable operators had pursued a strategy of vertical integration, in part to
achieve certain efficiencies, but also to deny downstream rivals the ability to offer
compelling content.38 According to the FCC, 53 percent (56 of 106) of national
satellite-delivered cable programming services were vertically integrated in 1993.39
31. 476 U.S. 691 (1984).
32. Id. at 704.
33. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
34. History
of
Cable
Television,
the
Cable
Center
(available
at
http://www.cablecenter.org/history/timeline/decade.cfm?start=1980)
[hereinafter
Programming
History].
35. See, e.g., PATRICK R. PARSONS & ROBERT M. FRIEDEN, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE
TELEVISION INDUSTRIES 9 (Allyn & Bacon 1998) (explaining that DTH operators caused their original
investors to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in the 1980s).
36. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in Markets for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Fourth Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 97-141, 13 F.C.C.R. 1034, 1070-71 (1998)
[hereinafter Fourth MVPD Report].
37. PARSONS & FRIEDEN, supra note 13, at 9.
38. See DAVID WATERMAN & ANDREW A. WEISS, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN CABLE
TELEVISION (MIT Press & AEI Press 1997).
39. Fourth MVPD Report, supra note 36, at 158.
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The Cable Television and Consumer Protection Act of 1992, which we discuss
below, would address these issues by compelling vertically integrated cable
operators to make programming available to rival MVPDs.
D. Consolidation of Cable Operators at Both the National and Local Levels
Another long-term trend among cable operators is consolidation. In 1985, the
top four cable operators—Tele-Communications, Time Inc., Westinghouse, and
Storer—accounted for roughly 35 percent of all U.S. cable subscribers.40 In June
2004, the four largest cable operators—Comcast, Time Warner, Cox, and
Charter—accounted for nearly 60 percent of all U.S. cable subscribers.41 Of the top
ten cable operators in 1985, only two— Time Warner and Cox—operated as an
independent cable provider as of June 2005.
In addition to consolidating on a nationwide basis, cable operators have sought
to collect “clusters” of cable systems within given local areas. A cluster is a
combination of geographically contiguous cable systems. According to the FCC,
the number of clusters covering a population in excess of 500,000 persons more
than doubled during the 1990s, from 16 to 34.42 As of the end of 2003, slightly
more than 53.6 million of the nation’s 66.1 million cable subscribers were served
by systems that were part of a cluster.43 Clustering of territories allows incumbent
cable operators to migrate the distribution of affiliated programming from satellite
delivery to terrestrial (fiber-optic) delivery, which is advantageous to cable
operators because only satellite-delivered affiliated programming is subject to the
program access rules created by the 1992 Cable Act.44 The practical effect of
clustering can be to make premium regional programming (particularly regional
sports programming) unavailable to DBS providers.45 In its 2000 Cable Price
Report, the FCC found that cable systems that were part of a cluster charged higher
prices than cable systems that were not part of a cluster, even after controlling for
other factors that might affect cable prices.46 The FCC found similar results in its
2001 Cable Price Report.47
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-CABLE SERVICES
Cable television providers invested in their networks to offer complementary
services, including high-speed Internet access and telephony. The FCC and the
courts have concluded that neither of those complementary services is a cable
service, and therefore neither should be regulated as such. These rulings are
40. KAGAN, TOP 70 CABLE SYSTEM OPERATORS, Mar. 31, 1985.
41. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 04-227, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755 ¶ 143 (2005)
[hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report].
42. Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video
Programming, Eighth Annual Report, CS Dkt. No. 01-129, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244 ¶ 67 (2002).
43. Eleventh Annual Report ¶ 142.
44. 47 U.S.C. § 548.
45. See, e.g., Andrew Stewart Wise & Kiran Duwadi, Competition between Cable Television
and Direct Broadcast Satellite: The Importance of Switching Costs and Regional Sports Networks, J.
COMP. L. & ECON. 679 (2005).
46. Statistical Report on the Average Rates of Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and
Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 16 F.C.C. 4346 ¶ 42 (2001).
47. Statistical Report on the Average Rates of Basic Service, Cable Programming Service, and
Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 17 F.C.C. 6301 ¶ 45 (2002).
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noteworthy considering the fact that the new services are provided over the same
cable system as the cable video service.
A. The Development of Cable Modem Service
In the mid-1990s, most Internet users connected with dial-up modems over
telephone lines. Cable’s television platform made it an ideal medium for
connecting to the Internet at much higher speeds once cable operators deployed the
requisite ancillary equipment. According to the National Cable and Television
Association (NCTA), between 1996 and 2004 the cable industry’s capital
expenditures were almost $95 billion, which equates to roughly $1,300 per
customer spent to upgrade cable systems, introduce new equipment, and launch
new broadband services.48 Cable modem service allowed customers to download
information at speeds 50 to 100 times faster than telephone-based modem
technologies. Another advantage of cable modem service vis-à-vis dial-up service
was its “always-on” feature, as well as the fact that cable modem service did not
interfere with normal telephone use. As of the end of the third quarter of 2004, the
cable industry served 19.4 million high-speed Internet customers and was the most
popular broadband access offering.49
B. The Development of Cable Telephony and the Subsequent Movement toward
Voice over Internet Protocol
In addition to launching high-speed Internet access service, cable operators
deployed circuit-switched technologies to provide business and residential
telephone services beginning in 1997.50 Cable operators became certified local
exchange carriers offering competitive residential voice services across the country
on an essentially unregulated basis. Beginning in 2003, many cable operators
launched VoIP service.51 VoIP provided many of the familiar user characteristics
of the public switched telephone network. The NCTA has described the technology
as follows:
Calls are placed over an IP-based data network and voice is transmitted with
data packets. The IP data packets used by services from some of the Internet
telephony providers travel over the public Internet. Facilities-based cable
offerings, in contrast, transport IP data packets over their private managed IP
networks with end-to-end quality of service monitoring (while still
52
interconnecting with the PSTN as necessary).

48. National Cable and Television Association, Broadband Services (available at
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=37).
49. National Cable and Television Association, High-Speed Internet Access (available at
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=93).
50. National Cable and Television Association, Telephone Service (available at
http://www.ncta.com/Docs/PageContent.cfm?pageID=32) [hereinafter NCTA Telephone Service
Report].
51. Id.
52. Id.
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At the end of 2003, Bernstein Research raised its cable telephony subscriber
forecasts to account for “cable operators’ accelerated telephony rollout plans.”53
By the third quarter of 2004, cable operators served roughly 2.8 million residential
cable telephony customers across the country through a combination of circuitswitched and VoIP technologies.54 VoIP over cable modem is expected to continue
to proliferate. Cable-company VoIP subscribers are projected to overtake cablecompany circuit switched voice subscribers in 2006. Bernstein projects that cable
voice services will reach 16.4 percent penetration of total U.S. households by 2010
(equal to roughly 18 percent of addressable homes),55 with 19.5 million cable
telephony subscribers by 2010 (including both circuit-switched and IP-based
lines), from a base of only 2.8 million at the end of 2003 (nearly all circuitswitched).56
C. FCC and Court Rulings That Cable Modem Service and Cable Telephony Are
Not Cable Services
In June 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided issues
related to the classification of cable modem service in AT&T v. City of Portland.57
The court considered whether a municipal government in its capacity as a local
franchising authority had the authority, under the Cable Act, to condition its
approval of a cable operator’s merger on the operator’s granting open access to
unaffiliated Internet service providers (ISPs).58 The Ninth Circuit held that the
cable modem service at issue, @Home, was not a “cable service.”59 The portion of
@Home that was used as an ISP was determined to be an information service,
while the portion of @Home that provided subscribers “Internet transmission over
its cable broadband facility” was determined to be a separate telecommunications
service.60
From 1996 through early 2002, the FCC declined to determine a regulatory
classification for, or to regulate, cable modem service on an industry-wide basis.61
In March 2002, however, the FCC concluded in its Cable Modem Declaratory
Ruling that cable modem service was “properly classified as an interstate
information service, not as a cable service, and that there [was] no separate
offering of telecommunications service.”62 In reaching this decision, the FCC
53. Bernstein Research, U.S. Telecom and Cable: Faster Rollout of Cable Telephony Means
More Risk for RBOCs, Faster Growth for Cable, Dec. 17, 2003, at 1-3.
54. NCTA Telephone Service Report, supra note 50.
55. Bernstein Research, supra note 53, at Exhibit 1 (projecting that 92 percent of total U.S.
households will be passed by either VoIP or circuit-switched systems by 2010).
56. Craig Moffett, et al., Bernstein Research Call, Cable and Telecom: VoIP Deployment and
Share Gains Accelerating; Will Re-Shape Competitive Landscape in 2005, at 2 (Dec. 7, 2004).
57. AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000), reversing 43 F. Supp. 2d 1146 (D.
Ore. 1999).
58. Id. at 875.
59. Id. at 876.
60. Id. at 878.
61. Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All
Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps To Accelerate Such Deployment
Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC Dkt. No. 98-146, 15 F.C.C.R.
20913, 20918 ¶ 8 (2000).
62. Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable
Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, GN Dkt. No. 00-185, CS Dkt.
No. 02-52, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4799 (2002) [hereinafter Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling].
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considered the meaning of the term “or use” added to the definition of cable
service by the 1996 Telecommunications Act.
As we explain below, the 1996 Telecommunications Act added the words “or
use” to the cable service definition, so that a cable service may now include
“subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or use” of cable
services.63 The FCC reasoned in its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling that the
amendment itself addresses only the use of content otherwise qualifying as cable
service.64 The one-way transmission requirement in that definition, the FCC
explained, continues to require that the cable operator be in control of selecting and
distributing content to subscribers, primarily a medium of mass communications
distributing the packages of video programming to all subscribers, and that the
content be available to all subscribers generally. When offering cable modem
service, a cable operator lacks that requisite control over the selection of the
information by the user, and thus “the ultimate control of the experience lies with
the subscriber.”65 The FCC’s determination that cable modem service is not a cable
service meant that the service was not subject to regulation under Title VI of the
Communications Act, as added by the 1984 Cable Act. Finally, the FCC
determined that cable modem service is an interstate service because the points
among which cable modem communications travel are often in different states and
countries.66
In October 2003, the Ninth Circuit ruled on several challenges to the FCC’s
Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling.67 The court affirmed the FCC’s ruling that
cable modem service is not a cable service, but the court, relying on its previous
decision in Portland, vacated the FCC’s ruling that cable modem service is not in
part a separate telecommunications service. Whether cable modem service is an
interstate service was not an issue on appeal.68 In October 2004, a number of
parties sought Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit decision, including the
National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of Mayors, the National
Association of Counties, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, and the
National Association of Telecommunications Officers and Advisors. The local
government petitioners argued that the FCC action deprived local governments of
their right to require cable operators to pay adequately for their use of public
property for private gain.69 In December 2004, the Supreme Court denied the local
governments’ cross petition for certiorari in the Brand X case but granted the
review sought by other parties.70 According to the National Association of
Counties, the decision would cost local governments more than $470 million in
annual franchise fees associated with cable modem service.71 In June 2005, the

63. 47 U.S.C. § 522(6)(B) (emphasis added). Cable operators wanted to ensure that their
franchise agreements authorized them to provide other services such as video on demand and game
channels, which at the time were more advanced than traditional one-way video offerings.
64. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 62,at 4832 ¶ 65.
65. Id. 61 ¶ 67.
66. Id. ¶ 59.
67. Brand X Internet Services v. FCC, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), stay granted pending
cert. (April 9, 2004), petitions for cert. filed, Nos. 04- 277 (Aug. 30, 2004), 04- 281 (Aug. 27, 2004).
68. Id.
69. Cross Petition for Certiorari, National League of Cities v. FCC, No. 04-460 (2004).
70. Certiorari—Summary Dispositions, National League of Cities v. FCC, No. 04-460 (2004).
71. Local Gov’t. Groups Express Disappointment Over Cable Modem Ruling; Could Create
Serious Financial Hardships for Nation’s Communities, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 8, 2004.
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Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and upheld the FCC’s declaratory ruling
on cable modem service.72
One month before the Supreme Court’s decision to deny the cities’ petition for
certiorari in Brand X, the FCC declared that cable VoIP was not subject to
traditional state telephony regulation.73 In particular, the FCC preempted an order
of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (PUC) applying its traditional
“telephone company” regulations to Vonage’s VoIP service. The FCC concluded
that Vonage’s VoIP service could not “be separated into interstate and intrastate
communications for compliance with Minnesota’s requirements without negating
valid federal policies and rules.”74 The Vonage decision was consistent with
previous orders adopted by the FCC in 2004, including the Pulver Declaratory
Ruling75 and the AT&T Declaratory Ruling.76
The FCC’s decisions with respect to cable broadband and VoIP can be
defended on efficiency grounds—namely, a network operator that invests in new
technologies should not be subject to legacy regulations that evolved under
different market conditions. If a portion of a network operator’s revenues
associated with a new service is captured by the municipality, or entry is
substantially delayed, then the operator might withhold the investment entirely or
limit the investment to areas where the expected returns are sufficiently large. The
FCC’s decisions are consistent with section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which instructs the FCC to encourage rapid deployment of new services.77
A consistent application of that principle would imply that a telephone
operator’s video service—which requires a huge capital investment to upgrade
facilities and equipment and to acquire programming rights—should not be subject
to legacy regulations. Moreover, because telephone companies already have the
right to use rights-of-way—just as cable operators already have such authorization
under their cable franchises—there are no public safety or other policy grounds to
impose additional rights-of-way requirements through a separate franchising
process.
IV. THE REGULATORY HISTORY OF CABLE SERVICE
Congress defined cable service in 1984 as the one-way transmission to
subscribers of video programming, reflecting the cable technology used at that
time. Despite the fact that Congress was aware of the two-way capabilities of cable
networks in 1984, and despite the fact that Congress revised the Communications
Act in 1992 and again in 1996, Congress did not revise the definition of cable
services to include that two-way functionality.

72. Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 125 S. Ct. 2688
(2005).
73. In the Matter of Vonage Holdings Corporation, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning
an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Dkt. No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,404 (2004) [Vonage Declaratory Ruling].
74. Id. ¶ 1.
75. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is Neither
Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, WC
Dkt. No. 03-45, 19 F.C.C.R. 3307 (2004).
76. Petition for Declaratory Ruling that AT&T’s Phone-to-Phone IP Telephony Services Are
Exempt from Access Charges, Order, WC Dkt. No. 02-361, 19 F.C.C.R. 7457 (2004).
77. Pub. L. No. 104-104,§ 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153.
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A. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 was protective legislation for
incumbent cable operators. The Act curbed the cities’ powers with respect to
franchise renewal and rate regulation, yet it preserved some limited role for
municipalities. Despite the fact that Congress was aware of cable’s ability to offer
data and telephony services, the Act defined cable service in a manner that
excluded these ancillary non-cable services.
1. The Act as Protective Legislation for Incumbent Cable Operators
The 1984 Cable Act was the first attempt by Congress to provide guidance to
the FCC on several critical issues relating to cable television.78 The Act is best
understood as a compromise between the interests of cities and cable operators:
cities relinquished certain powers in exchange for, among other items, (1) the
authority to require cable operators to upgrade and expand their video networks;
(2) the authority to establish certain facilities, equipment, and services
requirements; (3) continuation of local franchise fees and the ability to obtain the
maximum fee without an FCC waiver; and (4) the ability to require cable
companies to make available public, educational, and government (PEG) channels.
The carrots for the incumbent cable operators were, among other items, (1)
freedom from unreasonable demands by municipalities; (2) protection from
competition, especially during the franchise renewal process; (3) an end to rate
regulation in most markets; and (4) statutory limitations on franchise fees and other
cash payments.
Congress wanted to create national rules to govern local franchising
procedures with the aim of encouraging the growth and development of cable
systems.79 Before passage of the 1984 Cable Act, the FCC left the franchising
process largely to local authorities.80 The Act established franchising procedures
and an orderly franchise renewal process.81 By the 1980s, exclusivity for
incumbent cable operators had become virtually universal in practice.82 Potential
entrants unsuccessfully challenged the exclusivity provisions in franchise
agreements under the Sherman Act.83 The 1984 Act authorized municipalities to
grant “one or more” franchises, which the cities often interpreted as allowing them
the prerogative to grant merely one, exclusive franchise.84
Congress provided other protections from competition for incumbent cable
operators because it was evidently concerned that cable operators would be
unwilling to risk large amounts of capital to build networks if a local government
could unreasonably deny a cable system the opportunity to renew its cable
franchise at the end of the franchise period.85 As a result, Congress created a
provision that restricted a franchising authority’s ability to deny renewal of an
incumbent operator’s franchise unless the local government could demonstrate that
78. 47 U.S.C. § 521(1).
79. See DANIEL L. BRENNER, MONROE E. PRICE & MICHAEL I. MEYERSON, CABLE TELEVISION
AND OTHER NONBROADCAST VIDEO ch. 2 § 2.02 (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1996).
80. THORNE, HUBER & KELLOGG, supra note 30,at 229.
81. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521(2), 521(5).
82. THORNE, HUBER & KELLOGG, supra note 30,at 230.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. BRENNER, PRICE, & MEYERSON, supra note 79, at § 2.02.
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the cable operator or its proposal did not meet one or more of four statutory
standards.86 The 1984 Act did not impose a limit on the duration of a cable
franchise.
Finally, by codifying in section 533(b) certain cross-ownership restrictions on
local telephone companies,87 Congress also shielded incumbent cable operators
from entry by the local telephone company within the latter’s service area, thereby
eliminating a significant potential competitor for the incumbent cable operator.88
(This statutory barrier to entry was later struck down on the grounds that it violated
the First Amendment rights of telephone companies.89)
Congress also established a ceiling on the fee that cities could charge cable
systems for the continued access to public streets. Specifically, this annual
franchising fee could not exceed five percent of the cable system’s gross revenues,
and any non-capital PEG payments and other cash payments were counted against
the fee.90 The cap on franchise fees can be understood as establishing a ceiling on
the rate that would emerge under competition among rival cable operators for a
given local franchise. For example, in an open competition for a given franchise,
competition among rival companies for a de facto monopoly cable franchise could
have resulted in a franchise fee that substantially exceeded five percent.91
Congress also deregulated rates in the 1984 Cable Act and preempted local,
state, and federal rate controls in any community where the FCC found effective
competition to exist.92 In April 1985, the FCC determined that effective
competition existed whenever three over-the-air broadcast television systems were
available.93 Given that an overwhelming share of the U.S. population received at
least three over-the-air television signals at that time, this decision effectively
ended cable rate regulation (for a time) in most of the country.94
2. The Act’s Definition of Cable Service as One-Way Programming
Comparable to Broadcast Television
In the 1984 Act, Congress sought to establish a regulatory framework for the
delivery of the kind of cable programming that existed in 1984. In particular,
Congress sought to regulate the one-way transmission to subscribers of video
programming or other programming service. Accordingly, the 1984 Cable Act
defined cable television service as
(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming, or (ii)
other programming services, and

86. 47 U.S.C. § 546.
87. Id. § 533(b).
88. PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW 1196-97 (2d ed. Aspen Law & Business 1999).
89. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993),
aff’d, 42 F.3d. 181 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, 515 U.S. 1157 (1995), judgment vacated, 516 U.S.
415 (1996).
90. 47 U.S.C. § 542(b).
91. See discussion at Section VI.B., infra.
92. Id. § 552(a).
93. Implementation of the Provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Report
and Order, MM Dkt. No. 84-1296, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,637 (1985).
94. THOMAS HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION:
THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 54-57 (MIT Press & AEI Press 1997).
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(B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection of such
95
video programming or other programming service.

The Act defined “video programming” as “programming provided by, or generally
considered comparable to programming provided by, a television broadcast
station.”96 Despite their awareness in 1984 of technological developments in the
area of cable television—including a cable system’s ability to offer “two- way
services, such as the transmission of voice and data traffic, and transactional
services such as at-home shopping and banking”97—Congress defined cable
television service to reflect the technology being used for video programming and
to exclude “two-way” capabilities. It is reasonable to infer from this decision that
Congress did not want to undermine the development of these “non-cable services”
by subjecting them to regulation under Title VI of the Communications Act, as
added by the 1984 Cable Act. In addition, perhaps Congress did not want to
disturb any existing federal and state regulatory authority over the newly emerging
non-cable services.98
Since 1984, the design of telephone system networks has changed
dramatically. Telecommunications carriers have upgraded networks, and new
technologies (such as packet switching combined with Internet protocol) have
developed. For instance, as discussed in more detail below, an upgraded telephone
network that can deliver IP-enabled interactive service is completely different from
traditional one-way “video programming” as defined by the 1984 Cable Act. It is
therefore implausible to interpret the definitions of a cable system or cable service
to cover, respectively, a switched two- way local telephone network or an IP-based
video service delivered via that network. Although individual states may have had
their own definitions of cable services and systems, Congress established national
legislation that would promote the growth of, and regulate, all one-way cable
television services, not the type of IP-based interactive video services offered over
modern, upgraded switched telephone networks. We discuss below why IP-based
video service provided over a telephone network transcends anything that
Congress envisioned or codified in 1984 or thereafter.
B. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
focused on consumer protection, primarily through the re-regulation of cable
television rates. The Act also promoted competition in the distribution of
programming by mandating that vertically integrated cable operators offer program
access to rival programming distributors, and by prohibiting municipalities from
unreasonably denying second franchises for cable systems. Importantly, the Act
did not change the definition of a cable service.

95. 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).
96. Id. § 522(19).
97. Cable Franchise Policy and Communications Act of 1984, Report on Energy and
Commerce, No. 98-934,47 U.S.C. § 602, Aug. 1, 1984.
98. Id. at 29.
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1. The Attempt to Protect Consumers by Re-regulating Cable Television
Rates and Ensuring Access of Affiliated Programming to Rival
Programming Distributors
Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 199299 to address the perceived problems created by the structure of the
MVPD industry. By 1992, it became clear that Congress had added to cable’s
substantial monopoly power by enacting the 1984 Cable Act, resulting in
numerous consumer complaints about cable rate increases and poor customer
service.100 In an attempt to constrain this monopoly power, Congress re-regulated
cable rates, prohibited exclusive franchising, and imposed vertical and horizontal
ownership limits.
The 1992 Cable Act imposed new responsibilities on the FCC to regulate cable
television service.101 To stimulate competition, downstream competitors such as
DBS operators were granted access to all satellite-delivered programming provided
by vertically integrated cable networks.102 Despite findings by the FCC103 and the
Department of Justice104 that entry into video programming by local telephone
companies would be procompetitive on balance, Congress ignored the opportunity
to eliminate the restriction on telephone-company video services that it had
included in the 1984 Cable Act.
Congress reinstated rate regulation in 1992 by allowing both state and local
governments and the FCC to assert control over the rates for non-premium services
that cable systems could charge their customers.105 The 1992 Cable Act established
a complex system for regulating cable rates. Local rate regulation generally
affected only the basic service tier. Regulation of the higher tiers was to be
conducted by the FCC in response to complaints. Premium channels, however,
were exempt from regulation.106
Congress also empowered the FCC to impose both horizontal and vertical
ownership limits on cable companies. Specifically, horizontal limits capped the
total share of U.S. households that could receive multichannel programming from
a single operator,107 whereas vertical limits restricted the share of its channels that
a system operator could use to offer programming services in which it had an
attributable ownership interest.108 In 1993, the FCC set that channel-occupancy
limit at 40 percent and defined attributable interest to be five percent or more of
total equity in a programming service.109 The objective of the vertical restrictions
99.
47 U.S.C. § 543.
100. See, e.g., PAUL SIEGEL, COMMUNICATION LAW IN AMERICA 469 (Allyn & Bacon 2002).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f).
102. Programming History, supra note 34.
103. Recommendations to Congress and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
5784, 5847-51 (1992).
104. Reply Comments of the U.S. Department of Justice at 44, Telephone Company-Cable
Television Cross-Ownership Rules Sections 63.54-63.58, FCC Dkt. No. 87-266 (filed Mar. 13,
1992).
105. 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2).
106. For a detailed analysis of price regulation resulting from the 1992 Act, see HAZLETT &
SPITZER, supra note 94,at 68.
107. 47 U.S.C. § 533(f).
108. Id.
109. Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, MM Dkt. No. 92-264, 10 F.C.C.R. 4654 (1995). In 2001, both the

18

Robert W. Crandall, J. Gregory Sidak & Hal J. Singer

was to reduce the incentive of vertically integrated cable operators to favor their
affiliated content to the disadvantage of unaffiliated services.110
2. TheAbsence of Any Change in the Definition of Cable Services
The 1992 Cable Act did not redefine cable television service.111 Although
Congress did not consider the content to have changed significantly between 1984
and 1992, it did consider the downstream distribution platform to have expanded
beyond delivery of video programming services by cable systems. The 1992 Cable
Act defined a new service provider known as the multi-channel video
programming distributor (MVPD).112 This category was created to assist the FCC
in determining whether the incumbent cable operator faces “effective
competition.” The FCC subsequently ruled that MVPDs include cable,
multichannel multipoint distribution service (MMDS), DBS, and a telephone
company that provides pure video dialtone transport.113 The issue of a cable
operator’s market power was addressed once more in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996.
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 encouraged the ubiquitous deployment
of advanced services. The Act sought to remove entry barriers and open markets to
competition. The Act expanded the definition of cable service but did not change
the fundamental nature of cable service as a one-way service. As we explained
above, the FCC referred to the 1996 Act amendment in its Cable Modem
Declaratory Ruling, reasoning that the amendment addresses only the use of
content otherwise qualifying as cable service, and that a cable operator lacks that
requisite control over the selection of the information by the cable modem user.
1. The Decision to Enhance Competition in Video Programming by
Removing Barriers to Entry
The video provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 served to
promote competition in the cable industry by deregulating any cable operator that
was subject to effective competition,114 and by promoting entry among rival

horizontal and vertical limits adopted by the FCC were subsequently overturned by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. See Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d. 1126 (D.C. Cir.
2001). The FCC subsequently issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to consider whether new limits
should be imposed. Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MM Dkt. No. 92-264 (May 17,
2005).
110. WATERMAN & WEISS, supra note 38, at 13. By comparing the practices of vertically
integrated cable operators with non-vertically integrated operators, Waterman and Weiss found
empirical evidence that vertically integrated cable operators favored affiliated programming (either
by more frequent carriage or by lower pricing) and tended to offer fewer numbers of cable networks
to subscribers.
111. 47 U.S.C. § 522(5).
112. Id. § 522(12).
113. See THORNE, HUBER & KELLOGG, supra note 30,at 144.
114. See HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 94,at 68.
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MVPDs, including local telephone companies.115 Congress established a sunset
date of March 1999 for all rate regulation but the basic tier of cable television
services, and it phased out the remaining rate controls that had been imposed on
larger system operators.116 The Telecommunications Act immediately deregulated
small cable systems,117 which served about 20 percent of the estimated 61 million
cable households in the United States. The Act also allowed local telephone
companies to provide video service within their service territories, a provision that
we examine in greater detail below.
Through the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress gave a cable operator
the freedom to increase rates without prior notice to its customers if the operator’s
costs rose because of a change in a regulatory fee or franchise fee imposed by any
federal agency or franchising authority.118 An operator of an “open video system”
(OVS), which we describe below, was subjected to the payment of fees on the
“gross revenues of the operator for the provision of cable service imposed by a
local franchising authority or other governmental entity, in lieu of the franchise
fees permitted under section 622.”119
The 1996 Act did change the limitation on franchise fees paid by cable
operators by adding the phrase “to provide cable services” to the sentence, “For
any twelve-month period, the franchise fees paid by a cable operator with respect
to any cable system shall not exceed 5% of such cable operator’s gross revenues
derived in such period from the operation of the cable system to provide cable
services.”120 Finally, Congress prevented a local franchising authority from
ordering a cable operator to discontinue the operation of a cable system “to the
extent such cable system is used for the provision of a telecommunications service,
by reason of the failure of such cable operator or affiliate thereof to obtain a
franchise or franchise renewal under this title with respect to the provision of such
telecommunications service.”121
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 also removed many of the barriers that
had previously prevented local telephone companies from competing as video
operators.122 As explained above, the 1996 Act explicitly exempted OVS service
from franchise fees and from certain other Cable Act requirements, including the
requirement to obtain a local franchise. The Act’s definition of OVS service
allowed for 33 percent affiliated programming, with the remaining capacity
devoted to leased access on an open, nondiscriminatory basis.123 In particular, if
demand by unaffiliated video programmers exceeds capacity, then an OVS
operator is limited to providing programming to one-third of the capacity of its
own system, and it is obligated to allocate the other two-thirds to unaffiliated video
program providers.124

115.
LELAND L.
1994).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

For a review of the extant video prospects for local exchange carriers in 1994, see
JOHNSON, TOWARD COMPETITION IN CABLE TELEVISION 53-84 (MIT Press & AEI Press
47 U.S.C. § 543(c)(4).
Id. § 543(m).
Id. § 542(g).
Id. § 573(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Id. § 542(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 541(b)(3)(C)(ii).
See SIEGEL, supra note 77, at 469-70.
47 U.S.C. § 573.
Id. § 573(b)(1)(B).
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In exchange for this heavier access burden, OVS providers were exempted
from leased access, the federal requirement for local franchising, rate regulation,
and an array of other regulations imposed upon cable systems.125 OVS remained
subject to rules requiring PEG access and to must-carry obligations.126 The
limitations on vertical integration and new prohibitions on competitive buyouts
between cable and telephone companies applied to OVS.127 Finally, the 1996 Act
eliminated the requirement that a local telephone company obtain from the FCC a
section 214 certificate of public convenience and necessity before it could
construct or operate a video system.128
The 1996 Act directed the FCC to promulgate regulations to prohibit OVS
operators from “unjustly or unreasonably” discriminating among those video
program providers.129 In 1996, the FTC and DOJ advised the FCC that it should
not require OVS operators to carry the programming of in-region cable operators,
explaining that “mandated access for in-region cable systems could result in less
effective entry from OVSs than would otherwise be the case.”130 The antitrust
agencies told the FCC that competition in video programming distribution would
increase if the OVS operators were allowed to refuse access to their systems by
“dominant, in-region cable competitors.”131
The 1996 Act sought to enhance competition in video programming by
removing barriers to entry, especially those that stymied entry by telephone
companies. The 1996 Act tried to facilitate telephone company entry into video
services. But that experiment failed. To the extent that enhancing competition in
video markets remains an important objective for Congress, existing barriers to
telephone company entry, including cable franchise requirements, should be
removed.
2. Expansion of the Definition of Cable Service, But Not in a Manner That
Changed the Fundamental Understanding of It as a One-Way Service
The 1996 Telecommunications Act slightly amended the definition of cable
service. In particular, Congress amended section 522 by inserting “or use” after
“the selection” so that the updated definition now reads:
(A) the one-way transmission to subscribers of (i) video programming,
or (ii) other programming services, and
(B) subscriber interaction, if any, which is required for the selection or
132
use of such video programming or other programming service.

In its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, the FCC explained that the inclusion of
the phrase “or use” did not imply that cable modem service was a cable service
subject to regulation under Title VI of the Communications Act, as added by the

125. Id. § 573(c).
126. Id. § 573(c)(2)(B).
127. Id. § 573(c).
128. Id. § 571(c).
129. Id. § 573(b)(1)(A).
130. FCC
Press
Release,
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1996/07/ovs.htm).
131. Id.
132. Id. § 522(6) (emphasis added).
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1984 Cable Act. Cable service continues to be defined as the one-way transmission
to subscribers of video programming or other programming service.
The 1996 Act also narrowed the definition of a cable system by expressly
excluding more services. First, the phrase “(B) a facility that serves only
subscribers in 1 or more multiple unit dwellings under common ownership,
control, or management, unless such facility or facilities uses any public right-ofway” was removed from section 522, and was replaced with the phrase “(B) a
facility that serves subscribers without using any public right-of-way.” Second, the
exclusions that apply to telephone facilities were further expanded so that such
facilities providing video programming may avoid Title VI regulation if they are
used “solely to provide interactive on-demand services.” Third, open video
systems were excluded from the definition of a cable system. The term “interactive
service” was defined as “service providing video programming to subscribers over
switched networks on an on-demand, point-to-point basis, but does not include
services providing video programming prescheduled by the programming
provider.”133 Hence, the 1996 Act amended the prior definition of a cable system to
exclude (1) telephone facilities used solely to provide interactive on-demand
services and (2) facilities used to provide OVS service. Finally, the 1996 Act
provided that video programming provided in any other manner would be subject
to those requirements of Title VI that apply.
As explained further below, an IP-enabled video service provided over a
switched telephone network is not a cable service and Title VI does not apply
because IP video service is interactive, it is two-way, and it is designed to be
accessed at the subscriber’s discretion.134 This is in contrast to the definition of
cable service, which is a one-way transmission of video programming broadcast to
all subscribers, along with the subscriber selection and use of specific
programming from such one-way transmission.

133. Id. § 533(b)(2)(C)(12).
134. We understand that the network architecture for AT&T’s video service is designed to
permit maximum on-demand flexibility so that consumers can customize and order programming
sent to their premises at their discretion. The service allows the subscriber to individually select
which programming should be delivered (that is, transmitted) by first sending an upstream signal to
the AT&T video hub office—unlike the mass media delivery system of cable operators, which is
fundamentally a one-way transmission of all programming. The extent to which consumers will be
able to access certain programming at different time slots will depend on when AT&T secures the
appropriate copyright licenses from content owners to permit such use. An independent content
owner—that is, one that is not vertically integrated into a cable network—will generally seek the
largest possible downstream distribution for its content.
In late 2005, several on-demand transactions were announced by content providers, including
broadcast television owners. See, e.g., AOL Press Release, AOL And Warner Bros. Announce
‘In2TV,’ New Broadband Network On AOL.com, Delivering The Largest Offering Of Long-Form
Television
Programming
Online,
Nov.
14,
2005,
available
at
http://media.timewarner.com/media/newmedia/cb_press_view.cfm?release_num=55254474.
In
addition to music videos, Apple’s iTunes Music Store features select Disney and ABC television
shows for $1.99 per episode. See Your 24-7 Video Store, available at
http://www.apple.com/itunes/videos. These transactions indicate that content owners are availing
themselves of the new distribution opportunities opened up by new technologies.
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V. IS IP-ENABLED VIDEO SERVICE PROVIDED OVER A TELEPHONE NETWORK A
FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT SERVICE THAN TRADITIONAL ONE-WAY CABLE
SERVICE SUBJECT TO THE CABLE ACT?
The relevant statutory language and its interpretation by the FCC and the
courts do not include the IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone
network as a “cable service,” nor is the upgraded switched telephone network a
cable system. Even putting aside these definitional issues, there is little doubt that
IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone network is significantly
different from the types of services Congress intended to cover under the Cable
Act. Although the analysis in this section is based on AT&T’s network, the same
arguments could be made for any IP-enabled video service provided over a
telephone network.
A. IP-Enabled Video Service over a Telephone Network as an Interstate Service
The architecture of an IP-enabled video service over a telephone network, such
as AT&T’s network, is significantly different from that of a cable system. The
construction of AT&T’s video service is based on a telephone network, which does
not conform to municipal boundaries. Indeed, the AT&T network will have more
in common with a national video delivery system like DBS than with a cable
system. When cable systems were first launched, they were deployed in one
community at a time, with headends in each community. Cable operators could
pick and choose which community they would serve. In contrast, AT&T will
deploy two headends for its entire 13-state territory. The two headends distribute
certain satellite and other programming to approximately 41 video hub offices,
which serve regional areas within AT&T’s 13-state territory. To obtain video
service, a subscriber communicates with a video hub office, which may or may not
be located in the same city (or in some cases, the same state) as the subscriber. To
obtain other services that are integrated with the video service, a subscriber may
send signals to equipment housed in still other states in AT&T’s territory,
depending on what service is being requested. Ultimately, subscribers will also be
able to manage their suite of services, including video services, from remote
locations both inside and outside their home states. In this sense, AT&T’s video
service is an interstate service, no different from cable modem service as defined in
the FCC’s Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling,135 a service which is capable of
delivering a stream of video to the subscriber. Recall that the FCC determined that
cable modem service was an interstate service because the points among which
cable modem communications travel are often in different states and countries.136
The FCC also concluded that Vonage’s VoIP service could not “be separated into
interstate and intrastate communications for compliance with Minnesota’s [state
public utilities law] requirements without negating valid federal policies and
rules.”137 For similar reasons, IP-enable video service provided over a telephone
network is properly characterized as an interstate service subject to exclusive
federal jurisdiction.

135.
136.
137.

Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 62.
Id. ¶ 59.
Vonage Declaratory Ruling, supra note 73,at 1 ¶ 1.
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B. IP-Enabled Video Service over a Telephone Network as an Interactive Service
That Is Controlled by the User
AT&T’s video service will use a two-way, interactive network. AT&T’s
network architecture requires a two-way platform because the subscriber uses his
set-top box to request specific individual video streams from AT&T’s servers. This
two-way functionality fundamentally differs from the one-way functionality of a
cable television system, which transmits the entire array of possible video channels
to the subscriber’s set-top box. AT&T’s video service is a tailored digital feed.
Only by coincidence would multiple subscribers receive the same video program,
and no subscriber will receive a digital feed consisting of a broadcast of all
program offerings. Unlike a subscriber on a cable television system, both the
AT&T video subscriber, and the AT&T network itself, will be able to interact
continuously with AT&T’s IP-based video, as the video server responds
immediately to the subscriber’s upstream signal requesting a specific channel.
AT&T’s video service will provide customers with several options to
customize their viewing experience. For example, AT&T has stated that its
subscribers will be able to customize their channel lineups and video on-demand
features.138 Additionally, subscribers will be able to simultaneously view multiple
camera angles and statistics during live events.139 AT&T will also offer many
interactive options that are not available through cable services. For example,
subscribers will be able to program their television sets to display pop-up
reminders to begin watching a particular television show. The Microsoft TV IPTV
Edition platform will provide customers with picture-in-picture functionality,
which will allow subscribers, among other things, to preview shows and channels
while their primary channel continues to run in the background.140 AT&T will
offer some features that are not available even on the most advanced cable
platform. For example, because of its single IP platform, AT&T’s video service
will provide functional integration with Cingular wireless service for voice, video,
and data applications.141
The FCC reasoned in its Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling that the one-way
transmission component of the cable service definition requires that the cable
operator be in control of selecting and distributing content to subscribers and that
the content be available to all subscribers generally. The FCC explained that while
offering cable modem service, a cable operator lacks that requisite control over the
selection of the information by the user, and thus “the ultimate control of the
experience lies with the subscriber.”142 Similarly, while offering switched, pointto-point interactive video service, AT&T will lack the requisite control over the
selection of the content by its subscribers. Because the “ultimate control of the
experience lies with the subscriber,” AT&T’s video service is not properly
characterized as a mass-delivered one-way cable service.
138. Patrick Seitz, Fancy Media Players, TV Sets Will Take Center Stage At CES; The
Largest Tech Show In U.S.; Sony PlayStation Portable, iPod accessory products also likely to get
good play, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Jan. 5, 2005, at A4.
139. As noted above, see note 134 supra, although AT&T’s network will have the capability
to permit such subscriber-directed functions, the timing and extent of availability of such functions
will depend on contractual negotiations with content owners.
140. SBC Communications at Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. Media Conference—Final, FAIR
DISCLOSURE WIRE, June 8, 2005.
141. Id.
142. Cable Modem Declaratory Ruling, supra note 62,¶ 67.
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C. Other Critical Differences between IP-Enabled Video Service over a
Telephone Network and Cable Service
IP-enable video service provided over a telephone network will differ from
cable television service in several other significant ways. First, it will offer
consumers far more choice of content. AT&T will include hundreds of channels
and thousands of video-on-demand channels. AT&T’s capacity is essentially
unlimited because of its use of digital bandwidth. “Channel” choices are limited
only by the amount of bandwidth that can be brought to the home. From a
customer’s perspective, AT&Ts’ video service will change the way the customer
obtains programming. Because of the large number of options available to the
consumer, web surfing may be a closer analogy to the AT&T experience than
watching traditional broadcast television. It is anticipated that the typical customer
will be able to store an entire season of network television programming at the
provider’s network.143 AT&T expects that its storage capabilities will continually
increase as its content expands.
Second, AT&T will use a switched video network rather than a broadcast
network. The traditional broadcast video system that cable has used
continuously—and which is the basis of the definition of a cable television service
in the 1984, 1992, and 1996 legislation—sends content to every customer’s home,
and the video is displayed on the television as the cable operator generates and
distributes it. In contrast, a switched IP video network transmits only the content
that the customer requests, thereby freeing bandwidth for other applications. In
AT&T’s network, video will be stored centrally at IP-video hub offices, and
switching will specifically occur at switches and routers.
AT&T also improves upon the current cable-system architecture, which
requires set-top boxes to receive the complete channel schedule at all times.
Channel changing on a cable television system occurs within the set-top box,
which must tune to a different frequency within the schedule of channels that it is
already receiving. In contrast, on AT&T’s switched video network a set-top box
receives only one video program at a time, which it displays on the television
receiver. The set-top box requests the data stream for that video program, and
program changes occur at the instruction of the set-top box.
Third, AT&T relies on an IP network. Rather than rely on multiple servicespecific networks, as a cable television system does, AT&T’s network integrates
video, digital television, high-speed Internet, and VoIP into one network. All
services that AT&T will offer will be IP-based. In contrast, a cable television
system uses an analog broadcast for analog channels, a digital broadcast for
premium channels, and a switched digital video network for video-on-demand.
AT&T’s integrated IP network can offer its customers a quick delivery of
advanced services as a result of its flexible infrastructure.
Finally, AT&T’s video service is delivered over facilities that are already
authorized to be in the right-of-way. In Part VI.C. below, we explain that a
telephone company has already been granted the use of rights-of-way for the
placement of telephone facilities and equipment. By contrast, cable television
providers were not previously authorized to deliver services when they originally
143. Rana Foroohar, Changing Channels; The idea of sitting in front of a box in your living
room is becoming obsolete. For the TV industry, technology is creating vast opportunities—and risks,
NEWSWEEK INT’L, June 6, 2005, at 42.
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launched cable television service. This difference proves to be critical when
determining the appropriate franchise fee, if any, for telephone operators and
whether there is any public policy need for local franchising.
VI. ON PUBLIC POLICY GROUNDS, SHOULD IP-ENABLED VIDEO SERVICE
PROVIDED OVER A TELEPHONE NETWORK BE TREATED AS CABLE SERVICE?
Public policy considerations counsel that video service provided over a
telephone network should not be subject to cable regulation. Telephone company
entry would produce immediate consumer benefits in video markets. These
consumer welfare gains would substantially exceed the potential loss in franchise
fee revenues to municipalities. Furthermore, with some minor exceptions, there is
no incremental burden to the municipality from the local telephone company’s use
of existing rights-of-way to offer video service. To the extent that the local
telephone company pays any franchise fee, the appropriate percentage should be
substantially less than the prevailing five percent. The cable franchise requirement
probably would significantly delay the local telephone company’s deployment of
advanced services and, in the worst case, could discourage the local telephone
company’s investment in fiber.
A. The Consumer Welfare Gains from Price Reductions by Cable Operators in
Response to Entry of IP-Enabled Video over Telephone Networks
Existing cable and DBS customers would benefit from entry in the form of IPenabled video delivered over telephone networks. Upon ubiquitous deployment by
telephone companies into the local MVPD markets, all cable customers would
enjoy the benefits of lower prices that currently are available only to consumers in
geographic areas with wireline overbuilders. To calculate the savings to current
cable subscribers from such entry, one needs estimates of (1) the number of cable
households that are in a position to benefit from additional entry and (2) the
monthly savings in cable television service from RBOC entry. We estimate the
number of cable subscribers in currently non-competitive areas by multiplying the
number of basic cable subscribers in June 2004 from the FCC’s Eleventh Annual
Report (66.1 million) by the percentage of cable subscribers in “non-competitive”
communities (92.07 percent) in the FCC’s 2005 Report on Cable Industry Prices
survey sample.144 Using these figures, 60.86 million cable subscribers in “noncompetitive” areas paid an average monthly price of $45.56 for cable service in
2004. In contrast, monthly cable prices were 15.7 percent lower in geographic
markets with a wireline overbuilder than in areas where cable operators do not face
such competition.145 Therefore, if cable subscribers in non-competitive areas were
to realize a $7.15 decrease in the monthly price of cable television service (equal to
15.7 percent of $45.56) as a result of the telephone companies’ entry into the
144. In the Matter of Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service,
Cable Programming Service, and Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 20 F.C.C.R. 2718, Attachments
1 and 6, Report on Cable Industry Prices (2004) [hereinafter 2004 FCC Cable Pricing Study]; In the
Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, Eleventh Annual Report, MB Dkt. No. 04-227, 20 F.C.C.R. 2755, 2759 (2005)
(available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/csrptpg.html) [hereinafter Eleventh Annual Report].
145. 2004 FCC Cable Pricing Study, supra note 144, at 2727.
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delivery of video services, then the annual savings across all such subscribers
would be $5.22 billion. Because the decrease in prices would spur additional cable
customers, an additional surplus of $0.613 billion per year would be created by the
telephone companies’ entry.146 Figure 1 depicts the gain in consumer welfare
(equal to the savings by existing cable customers plus the welfare gains by new
cable customers).
FIGURE 1: CONSUMER WELFARE GAINS FROM UBIQUITOUS TELEPHONE COMPANY
DEPLOYMENT OF FIBER NETWORKS TO PROVIDE VIDEO SERVICES

Monthly
Price ($)

Deadweight
Welfare Triangle
$45.56
Demand for Cable
Television

Savings
$38.41

60.86

76.16

Quantity (millions)

The savings correspond to the rectangular area bounded by the old and the new
monthly price for cable television. The deadweight triangle gains correspond to the
triangular area below the demand curve bounded by the old and the new monthly
price for cable television.
The annual welfare increase among existing cable subscribers living in noncompetitive areas from ubiquitous RBOC deployment of fiber networks to provide
video services would total $5.83 billion (equal to $5.22 billion plus $0.613 billion).
A five-year net present value of the annualized savings would be roughly $26.52
billion (assuming a 5 percent discount rate). Of course, this estimate presumes that
all MVPD households in “non-competitive” areas are passed by RBOCs on the
first day of the first year in the five-year window. Finally, to the extent that DBS
146. Assuming an elasticity of demand for cable television of -1.5, 14.3 million new cable
television customers would emerge in response to a $7.15 price decrease. For estimates of the
elasticity of demand for cable television, see In the Matter of Implementation of Section 3 of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 Statistical Report on Average
Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Services, and Equipment, MM Dkt. No. 92-266, 15
F.C.C.R. 10,927, 10,946, Report on Cable Industry Prices, (2000) (“The estimated price elasticity of
cable according to this equation is 1.31, which indicates that the demand for cable services is
somewhat price elastic.”). The monthly increase in surplus for these new customers is equal to onehalf of the product of the change in price and the change in customers. These calculations ignore the
benefits from innovative interactive services that the telephone companies’ new video service will
deliver to consumers.
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providers responded to lower cable prices with price reductions of their own, the
welfare benefits from RBOC entry in video markets would increase by roughly 50
percent to nearly $40 billion.147
To the extent that local franchise requirements delay telephone company entry
into the MVPD market, consumers will not receive the benefits resulting from
greater video competition. Franchise requirements would harm consumer welfare
in related markets as well. Telephone companies are the most effective competitor
to the cable companies’ triple-play offering of voice, video, and data. Hence, the
inability of telephone companies to enter video markets quickly will undermine
their ability to compete effectively for the bundle of complementary services
currently offered by cable firms. Thus, consumers will be denied the benefits of the
lower prices that competition can bring.
The cable franchise requirement could also discourage the local telephone
company from investing in fiber. A local telephone company’s incentive to invest
in fiber depends critically on its ability to provide video service: without the
margins from video service, the investment might not be warranted.148 If local
telephone companies decide not to upgrade their network or to delay such
upgrades, then the deployment of broadband services will be slowed.
Finally, cable operators are not currently subject to franchise requirements in
broadband or VoIP services. The FCC and the courts recognized that the social
costs of regulating new services (in terms of forgone innovation) outweighed any
benefits (such as greater proceeds generated by the franchise fee). Subjecting a
telephone company’s video offering to cable service regulation would be
inconsistent with federal policy to promote deployment of new and advanced
services. It makes no economic sense to saddle telephone companies with legacy
regulations from a monopoly era as they enter video markets as one of several
competing providers. Neither cable operators nor telephone companies should be
discouraged from upgrading their networks to deliver new services by the threat of
legacy regulation developed under entirely different circumstances than the market
conditions that exist today. Nor does it serve any public policy objective to
regulate the third entrant in MVPD services behind cable operators and DBS
providers.
B. The Excess Burden on Taxpayers from Imposition of Franchise Fees on IPEnabled Video Services Provided over Telephone Networks
As we explained above, the annual welfare increase among existing cable
subscribers living in non-competitive areas from ubiquitous RBOC deployment of
fiber networks to provide video services would total $5.83 billion. This potential
welfare gain must be weighed against the potential loss in cable franchise revenues
collected by municipalities. After all, the worse-case scenario for municipalities is
that the RBOCs lure 100 percent of existing cable subscribers to their video
147. The total number of DBS customers (27 million) in the United States is equal to roughly
half the number of cable customers in areas not yet overbuilt (61 million). Because the welfare
calculations are linear transformations of the number of affected customers, the welfare gain of DBS
subscribers is equal to 44 percent (27 million ÷ 61 million) of the welfare gain for cable subscribers
in areas not yet overbuilt.
148. National Video Franchise, Local Broadband Attract Conflicting Viewpoints from
Industry, REGULATION & LAW, July 21, 2005, at A-14. According to Brent Olson, assistance vice
president of regulatory policy at AT&T, “this [AT&T] network doesn’t get built without video.” Id.
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offerings and pay the cities no franchise fee. Using a 2004 FCC estimate of 66
million total cable subscribers in the United States,149 and using Comcast’s 2004
estimate of average monthly video revenue from a cable subscriber of $50 per
month,150 the total annual revenue raised under the cable franchise fee across all
cities was roughly $1.98 billion (equal to 5 percent franchise fee × $50 per
subscriber per month × 12 months × 66 million cable subscribers). Hence, without
considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, the potential benefit from
RBOC entry into video services in the form of consumer welfare gains exceeds the
potential loss in franchise fee revenues to the cities by a factor of nearly three to
one. In the language of public finance, a municipality’s efforts to protect the
incumbent cable operator and the associated cable franchise revenues generates an
“excess burden” on taxpayers—that is, by impeding RBOC entry, the franchise fee
could generate welfare losses that exceed the revenues raised by the franchise
fee.151
Moreover, the fraction of the typical city’s budget that depends on cable
franchise revenue is miniscule. For example, the general fund revenue for Austin
in 2004 was $452 million.152 Cable franchise revenues were $6.5 million, which
amounts to roughly 1.4 percent of total general revenues.153 Table 1 shows the
revenue generated from cable franchise fees and the cable franchise contribution to
total city revenue for a sample of U.S. cities.
TABLE 1: CABLE FRANCHISE REVENUE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL REVENUE
City

Austin
Chicago
Denver
San Francisco
Washington, D.C.

Sample
Year
2004
2005
2005
2003
1999

Cable Franchise
Fees
(1)
$6,500,000
$14,500,000
$3,830,000
$6,980,000
$2,565,000

Total
Revenues
(2)

Cable Franchise
Fee Contribution
= (1) / (2)

$452,000,000
$5,092,000,000
$739,000,000
$2,310,493,214
$354,600,000

1.4%
0.3%
0.5%
0.3%
0.7%

Sources: City of Austin, Financial Performance Report for Six Months Ending March 31, 2005;
Government of the District of Columbia, Mayor’s Financial Report, Coming Together, Working
Together, 2001; City of San Francisco Comptroller, Tax Revenue Report, April 2005 (estimating that
all franchise tax revenue, including cable franchise fees, represents approximately 0.57 percent of the
city’s general fund resources); City of Chicago, 2006 Budget, Nov. 3, 2005. The City and County of
Denver, 2005 Adopted Budget Summary, Oct. 18, 2004.

As Table 1 shows, cable franchise fees rarely contribute more than one percent of a
city’s total revenues. Given the historical trend of increasing DBS share of the
MVPD market, the contribution of cable franchise fees to city budgets is expected
to decline regardless of the impact of RBOC entry in video services. Hence, it is
149. Eleventh Annual Report, In the Matter of Annual Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Market for Delivery of Video Programming, MB Dkt. No. 04-227, 20 F.C.C.R.
2755, 2759 (2005) (available at http://www.fcc.gov/mb/csrptpg.html).
150. COMCAST CORP. 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, SEC FORM 10-K at 24-25 (filed Feb. 23, 2005)
(showing average monthly revenue per video subscriber increasing from $47.11 in 2003 to $49.87 in
2004).
151. See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 305 (McGraw-Hill 7th ed. 2005).
152. City of Austin, Financial Performance Report for Six Months Ending March 31, 2005, at
3.
153. Id. at 10.
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curious why so many cities have vigorously opposed RBOC entry. Although the
gains from RBOC entry (in terms of lower prices and higher quality of video
service) are not captured directly by city officials, their desire to protect revenues
from cable franchise fees seems penny-wise and pound-foolish.
C. The Absence of Economic Justification for the Imposition of Additional Fees
for a Telephone Company’s Use of Rights-of-Way
Local telephone companies have already been granted the use of rights-of-way
for the placement of telephone facilities and equipment. With the minor exception
of the placement of limited equipment, there is no incremental burden to the
municipality from the local telephone company’s use of those rights-of-way to
offer its video service. The local telephone company already compensates public
owners for the use and occupation of public rights-of-way for the delivery of
telephone service, albeit at the state level (and in certain cases, at the local level);
consequently, the imposition of local franchise fees for video services delivered
over the same network would amount to double recovery by local and state
governments. The fact that the local telephone company is offering a new
service—that is, a service other than local telephone service—over the same
platform does not require a second franchise.154 If telephone companies are
discouraged from entering video markets by having to pay twice (once for a
telephone franchise and a second time for a cable television franchise) for the use
of such rights-of-way, consumers will continue to pay supracompetitive rates for
video service. And in those local markets where telephone companies enter but
pass along the duplicative tax in the form of higher rates, consumers will be denied
the full price-constraining effect that local telephone companies have offered in
other industries that they have entered, such as long-distance telephony.155
To the extent that a local telephone company is required to pay any franchise
fee before it may offer IP-enabled video service, the appropriate percentage should
be significantly less than five percent. Local franchise fees can be analogized to an
auction by municipalities for the rights to offer video service. When the
municipality effectively guaranteed monopoly provision of cable television, it
could demand the franchise fee associated with the monopoly price for cable
television. Indeed, free of federal intervention and other payments to government
employees, the franchise fee in equilibrium could be bid up to one penny less than
100 percent of the present discounted value of net cash flows associated with
monopoly provision of cable television. The equilibrium fee associated with the
monopoly provision of cable television reached by cities and cable operators was
five percent. Permitting local telephone companies to supply video programming
represents a repudiation by the municipality of its prior commitment to protect the
incumbent cable operator from competitive entry. Stated differently, had the
incumbent cable operator known ex ante that the municipality would not protect its
monopoly status, the cable operator would have paid less than five percent of its
gross operating revenues to secure a franchise. Hence, it makes no economic sense
154. Telephone companies are already required by the Pole Attachment Act to make their
private “poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way” available to cable television systems on a
nondiscriminatory basis. 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1).
155. See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Does Bell
Company Entry into Long-Distance Telecommunications Benefit Consumers?, 70 ANTITRUST L.J.
463 (2002).
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to require a local telephone company to compensate the city at the monopoly-era
rate of five percent of gross operating revenues when the market has at least three
competitors. The city should be guaranteed no more than its forgone revenues
(opportunity costs) under the assumption of competitive entry—not its forgone
revenues under the assumption of monopoly maintenance. And the city’s
opportunity cost associated with competitive entry would be significantly less than
five percent of gross operating revenues after telephony company entry.156 After
one determines that lower rate, it is then necessary to subtract the rate at which the
telephone company already compensates the municipality for the rights-of-way
(indirectly through state fees).157
D. The Consumer-Welfare Justification for a Uniform National Approach to
Video Franchising
From the perspective of an individual customer, the value of subscribing to a
network that delivers interactive services such as telephony, broadband, and
interactive television increases as the number of subscribers on the network
increases. Economists refer to this phenomenon as a network effect.158 The
presence of network effects in the provision of interactive video services requires a
wider geographical domain of regulation of local telephone operators, to the extent
that any regulation is justified. Simply put, a local regulator would not take these
benefits, which spill across municipal boundaries, into consideration when setting
fees and other rules. Purely municipal regulation of franchising would result in
franchise fees that were ineffectively high from the perspective of maximizing
societal benefits.159
Finally, state and local governments would benefit from increased
infrastructure investment by telephone companies. Because every dollar invested
in telecommunications infrastructure generates jobs and income through the
multiplier effect when a local economy is not at full employment, the planned fiber
investment by local telephone companies will generate tens of thousands of new
jobs per year and will contribute tens of billions of dollars to the U.S. economy
between 2005 and 2010.160 Removal of franchise restrictions could further
156. In reality, the cable operator may be locked into a long-term contract with the city at the
monopoly rate of five percent. But upon renegotiation or renewal of its contract, the cable operator
would insist on a payment significantly less than five percent.
157. For illustrative purposes only, suppose that a cable operator would pay only a three
percent franchise fee under the assumption of telephone company entry. Suppose further that the
telephone company currently compensates the city for the rights-of-way (directly or indirectly
through state fees) at a rate of two percent of telephone revenues. The appropriate franchise fee for
the telephone company would therefore be one percent (equal to the three percent opportunity cost
less the two percent existing payment for the rights-of-way), adjusted for any relevant differences in
the revenue base on which the percentages are calculated.
158. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. ROHLFS, BANDWAGON EFFECTS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
(MIT Press 2001).
159. Purely municipal regulation of franchising could also result in double marginalization: A
municipality issuing a video franchise in Los Angeles will reduce output without taking into account
the output reduction effected by anticompetitive municipal franchising in New York. To the extent
that a Los Angeles consumer interacts with a New York consumer over a broadband video platform,
the (perceived) monopoly margin will have been extracted twice. Aggregate output will be lower than
under a single franchising authority.
160. See, e.g., Robert W. Crandall & Hal J. Singer, The Effect of Ubiquitous Broadband
Adoption on Investment, Jobs, and the U.S. Economy, Sept. 17, 2003.
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contribute to expanded growth. Clearly, anything that delays these benefits from
materializing, including the imposition of local franchise fees on telephone
companies providing IP-enabled video services, should be rejected.
E. Public Policy Arguments of Cable Operators
In several forums, incumbent cable operators have argued on both antitrust and
public policy grounds that video service provided over a telephone network should
be subject to local cable franchise requirements. For example, in November 2005,
the New England Cable and Telecommunications Association Inc. (NECTA)
submitted testimony to the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control
(DPUC) during the agency’s review of regulatory requirements applicable to the
offering of video programming in Connecticut by ILECs in general and AT&T in
particular.161 The cable operators argued that “the [AT&T] network will operate
like a cable television system and, from a subscriber’s perspective, provide a
service identical to cable television service.”162 They argued further that “[a]ll of
the ancillary on-demand and other interactive features (picture in picture, multiple
camera angles) which [AT&T] touts as justifying deregulation either are being
implemented or have been implemented by cable operators, or are technically
feasible on a cable system.”163 If the issue before the DPUC was whether cable
television service and IP-enabled video service offered by a telephone operator
were in the same antitrust product market, then these considerations might be
relevant. But the reason that franchise requirements should not apply to IP-enabled
video systems offered over telephone networks, however, is not based on the
substitutability between video services offered by the telephone company and the
incumbent cable operator. Indeed, consumer preferences for certain advanced
services, such as video on demand, will likely induce all MVPDs to offer a similar
(if not the same) set of services. Telephone companies that use IP-enabled
technologies to deliver video service should be free of regulation for the same
reason that cable companies were exempted from franchise requirements for
offering VoIP and Internet access service—namely, that the FCC and several
courts chose to take a deregulatory approach to IP-based services. The rationale for
such a hands-off approach is that the FCC and the courts understood that a heavyhanded approach could undermine advanced services or IP-based business plans in
their infancy, and thereby could deprive consumers of large welfare gains. The
same logic applies to all video entrants who avail themselves of IP-based
technologies—not just the telephone companies.
In addition to these antitrust-based arguments, incumbent cable operators have
suggested at least four adverse policy implications of allowing AT&T and other
telephone companies to be free of cable franchise regulation. First, proponents of
franchise requirements for telephone companies claim that picking IP-enabled
video over a telephone network as a technology “winner” would induce cable
operators to make similar network changes solely to avoid the burdens associated
with cable franchise regulation.164 But if IP-enabled video service over a telephone
network is not subject to franchise regulation, and if these networks are deployed
161. See, e.g., Pre-Filed Testimony of Dr. Jeffrey A. Krauss for the New England Cable and
Telecommunications Association Inc.
162. Id. at 3.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 4.
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ubiquitously, then municipalities will be under tremendous pressure from the cable
operators to renegotiate their franchises. Any new arrangements with the cable
providers should, in theory, involve smaller franchise fees or reduced regulatory
burdens or both because the former monopoly protection offered by the
municipality would be eliminated. As the difference between the franchise fees
paid by the incumbent carrier and the telephone operator decreases, any incentive
of a cable operator to “pick IP as a technology” will diminish. In the ideal state, the
franchise fee paid by the telephone operator for the rights to offer a bundle of
video, high-speed Internet access, and telephony should equal the franchise fee
paid by the cable operator for the rights to offer the same bundle. To the extent the
telephone operator already pays a fee for the rights-of-way to offer telephony, and
because the telephone operator cannot be guaranteed a local monopoly on video
service, the appropriate franchise fee for video service paid by the telephone
operator should be less than five percent.
Second, cable operators argue that failure to impose franchise requirements on
telephone companies would “leave unprotected a number of important social
policy goals recognized in federal and state law, including requirements for serving
all households in a franchise area without regard to economic factors.”165 The
suggestion that the telephone company serve all households in a franchise area
“without regard to economic factors” is no different from the argument used
successfully by incumbent cable operators to prevent overbuilders from entering
several local MVPD markets. The basic economic principle of Pareto efficiency
requires that any transaction (such as adding a competitor in a single
neighborhood) that increases the welfare for some constituency (residents in that
neighborhood) without making any other constituency worse off (residents in
unserved neighborhoods) should be implemented at once. If the cable operators’
argument were taken to its logical extreme, then not a single neighborhood in the
United States would be eligible to receive a second wireline MVPD unless all
neighborhoods in the United States were served by a second wireline MVPD.
Third, cable operators argue that failure to impose franchise requirements on
telephone companies would encourage these video entrants to eliminate important
“public” services such as parental control, closed captioning, and PEG channel
capacity, which are currently provided (due to franchise requirements or applicable
law or both) by cable operators. It is not clear why regulation is needed to
encourage telephone operators or any other MVPD entrant to offer any of these
services. For example, parental control of channels is a benefit that is fully
captured by the MVPD customer. Hence, it is no surprise that DIRECTV
voluntarily offers this feature to its customers.166 Basic principles of economics
show that so long as consumers can internalize or fully capture the benefit of a
service, the unregulated market will produce the socially optimal amount of that
service. Regulation that corrects a market failure (too much or too little of the
service produced) is needed only when customers cannot fully capture the benefits
of a service—that is, some benefits from consuming the service spill over to the
general public. If a positive externality is proven to exist for a given service or
feature, then it may be appropriate to consider regulatory intervention that would
165. Id.
166. We understand that Congress may be investigating parental control as part of its larger
review of indecency issues. But Congress is not responding to a market failure relating to parental
control, and factors other than marketplace considerations are likely to influence any possible
Congressional action in this area.

April 2006

IP-Enabled Video over a Telephone Network

33

affect all MVPDs. And to the extent that a telephone company chooses not to offer
a specific “public service” such as PEG channel capacity, the small social cost of
that alleged market failure would be dwarfed by the large social benefits (in terms
of lower prices and higher quality) of having a second facilities-based MVPD
entrant.167
Fourth, cable operators argue that failure to impose franchise requirements on
telephone entrants would cause a severe loss of tax and franchise fee revenues.
This argument fails to recognize that municipalities can no longer provide
franchisees the level of monopoly protection that they once did . Hence,
municipalities ought not to be compensated at the same level. Even if maximizing
public revenues were the (perverse) objective of social policy, it is not obvious
whether the decrease in franchise fees would exceed the increase in tax revenues
from greater employment (by telephone companies) and greater expenditures on
video services, and the economic benefits to the community from more
sophisticated communications infrastructure. Social policy should be designed to
maximize social welfare, not tax proceeds. And with that proper objective, it is
clear that consumers would be better off with greater competition in the delivery of
MVPD services.
CONCLUSION
For the same reasons that a cable operator is not subject to second and third
franchise requirements to distribute cable modem and VoIP telephony services
over its existing network, a telephone company should not be subject to a second
franchise requirement to distribute IP-enabled video service over its existing
network. These arguments apply not only to AT&T,the first telephone company to
implement an IP-based approach to video, but to any other telephone company
(such as BellSouth) or any facilities-based entrant with rights-of-way authority
(such as an electric utility) that avails itself of IP-enabled technologies to deliver
video service. If a company is already authorized to place facilities in the public
rights of way, then additional franchising cannot be justified on economic or policy
grounds. IP-enabled video service provided over a telephone network is a
significantly different service from traditional one-way cable service, especially
due to (1) its interstate nature, (2) its high degree of interactivity, (3) the fact that it
is delivered over a switched network, and (4) its customer-specific control features.
Moreover, a cable franchise requirement would serve as an entry barrier that would
undermine the ability of telephone company entrants to compete effectively with
cable operators across video, voice, and broadband markets. Payment of franchise
fees would be duplicative of payments already made to state and local
governments. To the extent that a telephone company is required to pay any
franchise fee before it may offer IP-enabled video service in its existing territory,
the appropriate percentage is significantly less than five percent.

167. Moreover, in the case of PEG, the public policy need or rationale for “obligating” such
requirements should be reevaluated by municipalities in light of the development of the Internet as an
effective means of expression and communications.

